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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2006 Term
by RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT WORTHINGTON,**
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Introduction
This Study, the twenty-first in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 2006
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1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986
Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the Study in Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 Study]. The last
thirteen Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2005 terms, have been published in the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 1996
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997 Term, 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Study];
Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1999 Term, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 543 (2001) [hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 2000 Term, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247 (2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study]; Richard
G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2001 Term, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307
(2003) [hereinafter 2001 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2002
Term, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 497 (2005) [hereinafter 2002 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2003 Term, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 769 (2005) [hereinafter
2003 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2004 Term, 32
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 2005 Term, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 505 (2007) [hereinafter 2005
Study].
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Term. The analysis is designed to measure whether individual Justices
and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively," more
"liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms. As in
politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal" often lies in
the eye of the beholder. On such a point, members of the American
Constitution Society for Law and Politics and the Federalist Society for
Law and Public Policy Studies might well disagree.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases across
time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a claim of
individual liberty.3  By tracking the term-to-term conservative or liberal
changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices and the Court as a
whole across these ten categories, 4 and by applying standard statistical tests
to the resulting data,5 this Study attempts to provide reliable information
regarding the current ideological posture of the Court and its members, as
well as conclusions and projections regarding its past and future trends.
Whether statistical analysis of a complex and subjective process (such as
judicial decision making) provides useful information may well be
debatable.6 But, within the limitations inherent in an attempt to "number
crunch" ideology, this annual survey offers students and practitioners
information that is useful for assessing how the Court or an individual
2. The 2006 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from October 2006
through July 2007.
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally M.A.
RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987) (discussing
various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions, however, are close to the
core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "implies fear of sudden and
violent change[s], respect for established institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies
and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical deductions"). See also id. at 142
(asserting that "twentieth century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of
pluralism; certain of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain of a desire to
restrict government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally Robert V. Hogg & Allen T. Craig, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics 157-58
(5th ed. 1994); Raymond H. Myers, Classical and Modem Regression with Applications 9-11
(2d ed. 1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is far from random. Rather, it is the result
of a conscious decisional process. Furthermore, reliable statistics generally require large
quantities of information to produce reliable results. As sample sizes become larger, inferences
become more accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not
random and because it is comparatively small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may
not accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
[Vol. 36:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2006 TERM
Justice has voted-and may vote in the future-in particular categories of
cases.
I. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis of
each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment and
Equal Protection) or on the character of the parties involved (i.e., state or
federal government litigants).7 The tenth category tabulates the number of
times each Justice voted with the majority in cases decided by a single, or
swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's attitude
toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court decisions: the
protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The tabulation of
votes in these nine categories reveals, in broad strokes, the frequency with
which individual Justices and the Court as a whole vote to protect
individual rights8 or to exercise judicial restraint. 9
7. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in which
the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private party; (3) state
criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of freedom of speech,
press, religion and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7) statutory civil rights claims; (8)
issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability and related matters; and (9)
federalism cases. For more complete definitions of the boundaries of these categories, see infra
Appendix A.
8. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of state
and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the resolution of
claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause (Table 6), and civil
rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables I and 2 also involve individual
rights, as these suits pit the government against persons asserting private rights. The federalism
decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individual rights because such
decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the
practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to a party alleging state
encroachment upon his or her rights, and thus is counted as a conservative vote.
9. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Justices to
avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial restraint.
Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some indication of the individual
Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial
restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches of government,
adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds
exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues
rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result,
a vote in favor of individual rights claims (Tables 1-7) may provide some indication of "judicial
activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn
precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant because
Fall 2008]
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From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines whether
individual Justices and the Court are taking conservative or liberal
positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an assertion of
government power as "conservative" and outcomes that favor a claim of
individual rights as "liberal." Accordingly, the Study classifies as
conservative a vote for the government against an individual, a vote against
a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of
federal jurisdiction or a vote favoring state (as opposed to federal) authority
on federalism questions. The Study classifies all other votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions, which
constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the Court, are
included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative
ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such cases.10 Unanimous
opinions often result when either the law or the facts, or both, point so
clearly in one direction that ideology is not a decisional factor. 1
Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not always, or even
necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint. 12
Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and judicial
judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states within the federal
system.
10. Unanimous cases may comprise a significant portion of the cases tabulated on the
various tables. This Term, for example, five of eighteen cases were decided unanimously on
Table 1, seven of fifteen cases were decided unanimously on Table 2, four of sixteen cases were
decided unanimously on Table 3; one of three cases was decided unanimously on Table 5, three
of six cases were decided unanimously on Table 7; six of twenty-three cases were decided
unanimously on Table 8; one of nine cases was decided unanimously on Table 9.
11. An example of what seems to be a fairly non-controversial case for the court was Lance
v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194 (2007) (per curiam) (case was only six pages long and decided by a
per curiam--or unsigned-opinion).
12. For example, Justice Scalia voted against the federal government on four of the eight
cases tabulated on Table 4 (Federal/Criminal Cases) this Term. These votes result in a voting
record that is less "liberal" than anticipated. However, Justice Scalia's "concern for individual
rights" on Table 4 this year does not necessarily suggest that he has abandoned any commitment
to "judicial restraint." Some of Justice Scalia's votes on Table 4 reflect his preference for giving
statutory language its "plain" or "ordinary" meaning. See, e.g., James v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
1586, 1601 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While "plain meaning" resulted in a "liberal" voting
pattern on Table 4, Justice Scalia's enthusiasm for "plain meaning" may well flow from (rather
than run contrary to) his conservative values. See, e.g., M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, supra note 3 (noting that conservatism "implies fear of sudden and
violent change[s], respect for established institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies
and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical deductions").
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restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-appears sound.' 3
For example, deference to legislatures frequently results in rejection of an
individual's claim, especially one predicated upon the impropriety of
governmental action. 14 Judicial restraint is associated with a reluctance to
read new rights into the Constitution or statutes.' 5  Refusal to exercise
federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to the state courts with their possible
bias in favor of state governmental action and is a clear rebuff to the
claimant seeking federal protection of rights.' 6 Therefore, to the extent that
the Study's basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and
conservative outcomes are sound, it is possible to identify trends by
tracking the voting patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.17
To determine current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other Justices
this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1986-2005 Terms.
Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court as a whole can be
determined by comparing present outcomes of the Court majority with
those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this information appears in the
form of voting percentages for each Justice and for the Court majority.
Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically depict the voting trends revealed over the
years in the outcomes of Majority, Split and Unanimous cases on each
Table.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 2006 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern and
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
14. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007) (holding that a ranch owner did not
have a private right of action under the Fourth Amendment against employees of the Bureau of
Land Management who allegedly tried to extort from him an easement for governmental use).
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793, (2007) (per curiam) (holding that district
court lacked jurisdiction to consider habeas petition because prisoner did not obtain permission
from the Court of Appeals to file successive petition).
17. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The Study's general
assumption that votes favoring individual rights reflect liberal views is almost certainly not
accurate in every case. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (the typical conservative majority voted against the government and in favor
of an Equal Protection claim that the use of racial classifications to maintain racial balance within
individual schools was unconstitutional). In this case, the typically conservative Justices rack up
a "liberal" vote, even though some might assert that their votes reflect a "conservative" value.
See supra note 12.
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whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-Term voting
patterns of the Justices.'8
The Study also calculates an anticipated 2007 Term voting score for
each Justice on the various Tables. This statistic is calculated with an Auto
Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.' 9
The ARIMA model is useful in situations where, as in this Study at the
time of writing, a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast based
only on its present and prior values with no other explanatory variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the conservative
and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor analysis. This analysis
tests the extent to which the Justices' disposition of the cases on each of the
first nine Tables may have been influenced by liberal/conservative bias.
Factor analysis has been used in various empirical studies of human
behavior, including psychological inquiries into such personal traits as
personality and intelligence.2° The results of the factor analysis for the
2006 Term appear in Part V of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term and
over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates some of the
analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring the strength of
each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the Court with respect to the
cases actually decided in a given Term rather than against an absolute
scale.2'
All of the data and statistics reported in this Study must be interpreted
with caution. The percentages and statistical results revealed in each table
are affected not only by the dispositions of the individual Justices but also
by the nature of the cases decided each Term. Furthermore, Supreme Court
cases are not the result of random selection and the universe of votes cast
by the Justices is relatively small. Since both random sampling and large
sample size are crucial elements of any fully reliable statistical analysis,
conclusions drawn from this Study are hardly beyond dispute. There are
obvious limitations to any empirical analysis of a subjective decision-
making process.22
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is worth
conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced Supreme
18. See infra Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10.
19. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
20. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
21. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
22. See supra note 6.
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Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological leanings of
individual Justices in framing their arguments to the Court. Moreover, both
the media and academicians are fond of attaching ideological labels to the
Court and its personnel. Supreme Court practitioners, legal scholars and
the public have long assumed that assessments of Court ideology are
valuable, even though such assessments may be based upon little more than
the gut reactions of the attorneys, scholars and news reporters involved.
This Study, based upon a systematic methodology for objectively
gathering, quantifying and analyzing data over time, should be substantially
more reliable than these ad hoc assessments.
II. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2006 Term
The data collected on Tables 1-10 this Term tend to show fairly
consistent conservative movement in a broad range of cases-with Tables
1, 2, 4, 8, 9 and 10 showing conservative movement of various degrees.
The conservative movement on Table 4 may be less than notable, due to
the small universe of decided cases, and the movement on Tables 8 and 9 is
rather weak (considering the fact that the majority of jurisdictional cases on
Table 8 continue to be decided liberally in favor of a claim of federal
jurisdiction and the majority of the federalism claims on Table 9 are still
decided liberally against the state). Nevertheless, the conservative trend on
the Court seems rather clear, with only two Tables showing noteworthy
liberal movement (e.g., the liberal outcome of Majority and Split decisions
on state criminal cases on Table 3 and the liberal movement in the decision
of statutory civil rights claims on Table 7). The limited amount of data
collected on Tables 5 and 6 (First Amendment and Equal Protection
claims) and the volatile voting patterns demonstrated on those Tables make
it difficult to gauge whether they demonstrate either conservative or liberal
voting behavior.
In addition to an over-all conservative trend, the Tables also show
continuing ideological polarization on the Court. Factor Analysis
highlights Tables 1 and 3 as the most reliable indicators of potential
ideological bias during the 2006 Term. Those Tables, moreover,
demonstrate the five/four conservative/liberal divide on the Court-with
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito and Kennedy taking conservative
positions and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter holding the
liberal slots.
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Data Table 1: Civil Cases-State Government versus a Private Party
In 2006, the Court demonstrated conservative movement on Table 1-
although not as pronounced as the liberal movement on Table 1 last Term.
Six of the seven Justices with an extensive enough voting history to make
the calculation possible demonstrated statistically significant changes in
voting behavior, all in a conservative direction. The Court as a whole,
moreover, voted more conservatively in the outcome of Majority, Split, and
Unanimous cases than in 2005. Nevertheless, Table 1 has demonstrated
volatile movement over the past few years, swinging from conservative to
liberal to conservative patterns. Accordingly, the data on Table 1 must be
used with caution.
As it has in every Term but one since 1999, the Court sided with the
government more than 50 percent of the time. The Court decides the great
majority of civil cases in favor of state governments-over two thirds this
Term. In the 2005 Study, we anticipated that Table 1 would become more
polarized between conservative and liberal Justices. While the Court's
overall conservative movement undercuts this prediction somewhat, the
data does show that the Court split along stereotypical lines-with Justice
Scalia holding the most conservative position (84.2), Justice Kennedy the
middle (63.2), while the liberal positions on the Table (led by Justice
Stevens at 47.4) were held by the four most liberal Members of the Court.
Finally, Factor Analysis for 2006 demonstrates that Table 1 is the
second most reliable indicator of possible bias. Based on this statistic, and
the orientation of the individual Justices on Table 1 over time, we expect
that-regardless of whether the Court as a whole moves in a more liberal or
conservative direction-Civil State cases will continue to demonstrate
rather reliably the individual Justice's ideological tendencies.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government versus a Private Party
The Court reversed last year's liberal movement on Table 2 by
returning to a conservative norm in 2006. The general rule that the federal
government wins in the Supreme Court continues to hold, with an
impressive 76.5 percent win rate, the third highest in the past decade.
In departing from the somewhat idiosyncratic results of last year,
Justice Souter has fallen from the third to the sixth most conservative
Justice and Chief Justice Roberts has moved from the most liberal to the
most conservative position on the Table. While Justice Scalia, rather than
Justice Kennedy, occupies the middle position, the Court still divided along
the typical five-Member conservative and four-Member liberal blocs.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 36:1
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Data Table 3: Criminal Cases-State Government versus a Private Party
Factor analysis indicates that Table 3 provides the most reliable
evidence of conservative or liberal bias this Term. The movement,
however, is somewhat split, diverging from the 2005 Term's clear
conservative movement. The Unanimous cases (where ideology may play
less of a role 23) show conservative movement, with 80 percent of such
cases reaching conservative outcomes. Majority and Split cases, by
contrast, show liberal movement. The Majority cases shifted liberally
nearly ten points, with the Split cases demonstrating a more dramatic 16.7
point shift. These voting patterns suggest that-in divided (and more
contentious) cases-the Court in 2006 tended to favor liberal outcomes,
reaching conservative results only in unanimous cases where ideology
plays less of a role. The Court's increasingly idiosyncratic and
unpredictable analysis of death penalty cases may explain the somewhat
unusual voting behaviors demonstrated on Table 3 this Term.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases-Federal Government versus a Private
Party
The Justices decided only three federal criminal cases during the 2006
Term, with only four Justices voting in all of the cases. As a result, the
reliability of the data on Table 4 has decreased considerably this year. The
small universe of federal criminal cases in 2006 may result from the
decision of Rita v. United States,24 which concerned federal sentencing
guidelines. Because of the potential importance of this decision, the Court
may have accepted fewer cases in 2006, waiting to see how lower courts
would react to its Rita opinion.
Accordingly, although the movement in this category is clearly
conservative with 100 percent of the cases decided in favor of the
government, given the small number of cases, Table 4 does not reveal
much about the ideological orientation of the Court in federal criminal
cases. One interesting note is that Justice Scalia voted the most liberally on
Table 4 this Term, voting only 33 percent of the time in the government's
favor. Justice Scalia's plain language approach to constitutional and
statutory decision-making may well explain this seemingly anomalous
departure from his typical conservative stance.
25
23. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
24. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
25. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. Ct. 782 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that in upholding an unspecific grand jury indictment, the Majority diverged from well-
established law that the indictment must "fully, directly, and expressly" set forth all elements of a
Fall 2008]
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association and
Religion
The outcomes on Table 5 remain volatile, partly because of the few
number of First Amendment questions that have come before the Court:
last Term there were only six issues tabulated and this Term there were
only four. Only Table 6, Equal Protection, has a smaller data set.
Table 5 has demonstrated highly volatile voting patterns over the past
eight Terms, with no coherent trend (either conservative or liberal) evident
in the tabulated data. Perhaps the most important inference that can be
drawn from the data on Table 5 is that the Court--over the course of nearly
a decade-has been unable to articulate a coherent and consistent approach
to the First Amendment issues it has addressed.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
The Court-as it did last Term-decided only one Equal Protection
claim in 2006. However, a low number of cases on Table 6 is typical.26
Unlike last Term, furthermore, the Court voted in favor of the claim, a
liberal shift.27 In a pole-switching vote, the conservative Justices upheld
the claim to reach a conservative result on the merits. Accordingly, a
"liberal" vote to achieve a "politically conservative" outcome in a single
case provides very little reliable statistical data. Not surprisingly, Factor
Analysis demonstrates that Table 6 provides little reliable indication of
ideological bias.28
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
The Court on Table 7 seems to have shifted slightly more liberally this
Term with the Court voting in favor of 66.7 percent of Statutory Civil
Rights Claims, up from last year's 54.5 percent.29 The trend in Majority
and Split cases is liberal, with a 30-point liberal movement in the outcome
of Split decisions. The Unanimous cases demonstrate slight conservative
movement, although remaining at a relatively high liberal outcome in 75
percent of the cases. As a result, the overall trend appears to be liberal.
crime (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882))); James v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 1586 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the Court's interpretation of a federal
statute).
26. See studies cited supra note 1.
27. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
28. See infra Section V.
29. See infra Data Table 7.
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Nevertheless, Factor Analysis ranks Table 7 as the least reliable indicator
of ideological bias this Term.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
The Court demonstrated slight conservative movement on Table 8
during the 2006 Term in the outcome of Majority, Split and Unanimous
cases. In Majority and Split cases, the conservative movement was
approximately six points, with a somewhat largely 10 point conservative
movement in Unanimous decisions.
The Court is fairly predicable on jurisdictional issues. As
demonstrated by Chart 8, since 1999 the Court has rather consistently
decided more than 50 percent of all cases (Majority, Split and Unanimous)
in favor of an assertion of federal jurisdiction. This high predictability
results in fairly accurate predictions of the voting behaviors of individual
Justices; this Term every Justice voted within 20 points of his or her
anticipated score. While Factor Analysis suggests that Table 8 is one of the
least reliable Tables at demonstrating ideological bias, this is likely due, at
least partially, to the fluid nature of the Court's approach to jurisdictional
issues, with both liberal and conservative Justices often willing to stretch
established jurisdictional rules in order to reach a favored outcome on the
merits.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases
Table 9 is the fourth most reliable indicator of bias this Term and the
trend, albeit a weak one, is conservative. Regardless, it is a notable shift
after last Term's clear liberal trend. In Majority and Split cases, the Court
voted somewhat more conservatively than last Term; however, 100 percent
of the Unanimous cases came out against the state, as they did last Term.
This conservative movement should not be overstated, however, because-
regardless of the shift in their favor-state governments are winning
significantly less than hplf the time.
Interestingly, three of the most traditionally liberal Justices on the
Court seem to favor state claims more often than the traditionally
conservative Members of the court. In 2006, Justices Stevens, Breyer and
Ginsburg all voted with the state 40 percent of the time.3 °
30. See infra Mean Table 9.
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Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
Justice Kennedy's power is nowhere more evident than on Table 10,
which he controlled with a staggering 100 percent of votes with the
majority in closely divided cases. As one would expect with the most
moderate of the conservative Justices controlling the outcome of these
cases, Table 10 shows a moderate conservative trend, with 60 percent of
swing votes yielding a conservative outcome-up nearly seven points from
the results last Term. The generally conservative tenor of this Table
continues as it has to varying degrees since 1999.31 Despite Justice
Kennedy's willingness to vote liberally in some cases, liberal frustration
with the Court can be seen in the scores of the other eight Justices-the
four more conservative Justices each were able to vote with the majority in
close cases more often than the four liberal Justices.
31. Id.
[Vol. 36:1
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Data Table I
Civil Ca er Sn=e GoJnverr Veus a Pri P' rt
Articipaed
Justice V es ret Governmen! X2 2C06 Term scores
1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2002 2003 2004 20 2006 For Aplmt 2006 Enor 207
Term TCem T - Term Tcn Term Term Te=n T=rm TOM GOWN Goat Tcrn T=
Scalia 60.0 55.2 50.0 60.0 62.5 48.0 53.9 78.9 75.0 84.2 16 3 66.0 t8.2 79.2
Thomas 60.0 65.5 50.0 60.0 75.0 60.0 53.3 89.5 75.0 82.4 14 3 74.1 8.3 80.2
Roberts 600 655 6 6.7 60,0 75.0 400 513 824 73.3 73.7 14 5 *
Atiho q5 1 2 (S.6 51 3 .11 4.40 400 69 4 66.7 63.2 12 7 .
Kernry 53.3 511.7 44.4 S3.3 68.8 36.0 57.2 84.2 68.8 63.2 12 7 63.3 -.0 1 63.7
So=ee 46.7 37.9 50.0 53.9 43.8 52.0 42.9 63.2 43.8 57.9 11 8 50.3 7.6 48.1
G's" 46.7 31.0 44.4 46.2 50.0 56.0 35.7 57.9 37.5 57.9 11 8 58.6 .0.7 41.0
Bre(*r 46.7 44.8 52.9 35.7 50.0 48.0 35.7 73.7 31.3 52.6 10 9 75.4 -22.8 47.1
Ste'srt 37.5 17.2 41.2 40.0 37.5 54.2 28.6 52.6 375 47.4 9 10 41.9 5.5 38.
Msaiy 46.7 44.8 55.6 60.0 6U. $2.0 46.7 73.7 6M. 684 23 6 62.2 6.3 65.8
Spt 33-3 47.2 58.3 63.6 70.0 44.A 50.0 66.7 163.6 66.7 3 
4
2Jcinrru 5S.6 42.7 50.0 50.0 66.7 56.3 40.0 85.7 1160.0 72.4[ TS 2
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Civil Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
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Man Table I
Ciil C S= GoVswrrn= Vw.so Pri -. pzr _
mmtei M- v.n P--13 99 oric 1=d4 C1Vu3KroZ Didt Ic lm Stwm a S~zzr==-
All P6rTer'm (p) 1m2- f l'simc- r o p ( w, T16TTe-m 2X22 S.Teirmr C(_ 2-r-a h; V rtj M=-ke.v?
Rob.s 659 7365
AlI 54.7 * 63.16
Sw~b S9.7 41o 5.6 9.81 8421
K==dy 54.8 "4.02 13,85 63.16 ),v
Soare 46.9 .4. 6.2 9.64 57.S9
TlrMas 63.1 4,-8.7 13.12 82.35
Ghrb n 45.0 .-f60 8.45 57.89 Sm
B6rr'e" 45A .7-9D 12.16 52.81 Ar
Regression Table I
Civi Cases. State Government Versus a Private Party
Correlation (p) I R2
Justice Roberts Stevens Alito Scalia Kennedy Solner Thomas Ginburg
Stevens
Alito
Scalia *
Kennedy * 0.76/0.55
Souter
Thomas* 0.88/0.75 0.76 0.56
Ginsburg * 0.9210.84 * 0.730.49
8 1 -er * I 0.72.0.47 0.70.0.45
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I)t3t Table 2
C1, it Caws: Fedot C cn 4a Versus a Private Party
Jamice 3 VM' 17Go.: ~ X2 208 em AKi *,Soe
Vec-s
1997 1M8 1999 2(0 2001 2012 2G03 2M04 2005 2006 For Azist 20.5 F=ee 2C07
T=so Tcrrm Te Tcr T Ter m Ter T Tm er m Tn Term G' GoV': Term Tone
Roberts is 1 -0 "h, )s 1. )9 792 714 50.0 80.0 12 3 "
Alito I, ' 410 t t) 53t, fi14 '1 . S" 65 66.7 76.5 13 4 "
K,-r.ndy 45.3 50.0 50. 47.1 62.5 90.9 75.0 62.3 4.5 76.5 13 4 61.9 14.6 67.5
Thaan.k 33.3 55.6 40.0 52.9 45.8 63.6 75.0 75.0 63.6 75.0 12 4 65.2 9.8 724
Scaia 32.4 61.1 60,0 563 $6. 63.6 73.9 62.3 54.3 68.8 II 5 SS.S 13.0 61.2
Sorder 47.6 66.7 50.0 52.9 50.0 63.6 75.0 50.0 63.6 66.7 12 6 40.1 18.6 57.7
Stereos 55.0 68.4 30.0 64-21 62.5 .0 69.6 62.5 54.1 38.8 10 7 62.7 -3.9 64.2
Gimbur8 40.9 68.4 5.0 52.9 66.7 72.7 66.7 75.0 34.5 58.8 10 71 -12.2 62.0
Oreyrr 57.1 61.1 70,0 50.0 66.7 72.7 75.0 87.5 54,5 46.7 7 1 09.7 .43.0 492
M efy 36.4 61.1 30.0 47.11 75.0 91.0 79.2 75.0 54.51 76.5 13 41 72.3 4.2 6.
Slt 26,7 50.0 33.3 4".A 69.2 100.0 66.7 60.0 30.0 7. 6 2
5eemot 7.1 75.0 75.0 50.0 81.1 77.0 91.7 100.0 57.1 77.08
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Civil Cases: Federal Government Versus a Private Party
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____________ 0 CC$= ass Farm.tcrnm"e Vcts1 a lI Pret ___________
Amme McmV04m ftcnua %6 (,nrw= stn&- Mea V~m3 13ccu; 0 I 3 lho =s ,tos a SOMerls -
All PriorTeme tp) h "r', (or lrt Mrae Dorriee ofp (5) 4 at Te (X2) Signlrw-m c ,-.,Te inV t e Br~sirv7
b67.7 6.70
Steve-et 57.1 +1- 5.9 10.21 30.82 rl
Alito 61.4 76.47
sctILr 60.2 +l. 5 9.26 60.75 015
KeselY 61.5 +1.7.4 12.49 76.47 )cs
SOWoo 61.2 +!- 7.3 1135 66,67 ao
Ttsers 54.5 +1.8.6 12, 754) Y"
Gwrsburj 62.3 *.'- .6 12,01 0.82
t r*er 64.7 -. &7 11.75 4667
Regression Table 2
Civil Cases: State Govemrnment Versus a Private Party
Correlation (p) / R'
Justice Roberts St.ens Alito Scalia Kcnnedy So-ter Thomas Ginsburg
Steves
Alito
Scalia
Kennedy
Sourrer
Thomas
Ginsbur*g 0.7110.46
Breycr ____ ____ •___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
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Data Table 3
crimirr. CC=.~ Sizv a ,rn n i c ar npfz= Polny
rLWr=1r Vc.z. ar Gwmar.z.a X2 2M Tncn Antiipated
Vows
1997 199 1999 201 2 201 2 2W3 204 2005 2006 For Againsi 2006 Effer 2007
Tern Tern Ten Tern TLm Teram Tc Term Term Temn GaWI Gtrv't Trnm Term
Alito 714 ,,. 7r 1 q) 4-1 ,2 k, 692 13 75.0 94.1 16 I .
scala 64.6 72.7 b2.6 66.7 94,6 624 769 76.9 7.3 98.2 Is 2 38.3 29.7 801
Tharrrns 92.3 80.0 82.6 66.7 84.6 94.1 0.0 80.8 82.6 88.2 15 2 89.1 -0,9 69.3
Rebrr If, "' -1 111 "( 14 ." h 78.3 82.4 14 3 .
K-rmaly 76.9 34.6 7,3 50.0 76,9 64.7 64.0 61.5 69.6 64.7 II 6 65.1 -0.4 70.6
ire 30.0 364 49.9 23.0 30.8 29.4 44,0 46.2 39. 1 29.4 S 12 403 .11.1 37.9
Stcms 23.1 9.A 27.3 33.3 1534 294 320 23.1 34.8 23.3 4 13 24. 0.9 28
SO= 57.1 36.4 27.3 33.3 23.1 3S.3 40.0 23.1 47.8 23. 4 13 22.2 1.3 28.9
Ginburt 1 42.9 27.3 36A 23.0 23.1 23.5 36.0 34. 47.8 23.3 4 13 42.6 -19.1 29.5
MzWrty 71.4 63.6 65.z 50.0 3040 38A 63.0 30303 69.6 58.8 10 7 63.9 -5.1 61.9
Split 66.7 77.S 62.3 60.0 40. 30D.0 62.3 44A 66.7 30.0 6 6
Lrmbrrrrmn M00 0.0 71.4 42.9 73.0 60.0 63.6 62.3 72.7 80.0 4 1
Chart 3
Criminal Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
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Regression Table 3
Criminal Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
Correlation (p) I R'
Justice Roberts Stevens Alito Scalia Kennedy Souler Thomas Ginsburg
Stevens
Alito
Scalia
Kennedy
Souter
Thomtl 0.880.75
Ginsburg *
lircc S
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Iata Table 4
Criminal C :m: FPd-ral Govc-rnmc Versus a Pulo:a Party
US= Vos far Go, cn rracal X2 2 T Aicip~ed
Votes
1997 1993 1999 20 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Fr r Agnist 2G6 LErrr 2007
Term Tcma Term Ten Term Term Term Term Tcrn Term GoVI GowA Term Term
Roberts 7() 764 6,6 A71 1000 667 0 727 5100 100.0 3 0
Aliat M)0 646 546 57 I C(420 40.0 727 615 57.1 100.0 3 0
Kennedy 90.0 76.9 54.6 28.6 100.0 50.0 72.7 61.5 50,0 100.0 3 0 58A 41.6 51.8
BrMWce 70.0 53.9 45.5 28.6 100,0 33.3 54.6 38.5 12.5 100.0 3 0 26.4 73.6 14.5
Stem 55.6 38.5 36.4 14.3 62.5 0.0 45. 15.4 25.0 66.7 2 1 23.2 43.5 26
Souter 70.0 46.2 36.4 16.7 75.0 33,3 36.4 15.4 12.5 66.7 2 1A6.4 503 25.3
Tlirmas 90.0 62.3 54.6 85.7 87.5 66.7 80.0 535 6 6.7 66.7 2 67.8 .1.1 65.1
Ginsburg 60.0 53.9 36.4 28A 75.0 33.3 54.6 25.4 25.0 66. 2 2 25.2 41.5 24.6
Scalia 70.0 46.2 63.6 85.7 100.0 60.0 70.0 30.8 50.0 33.3 1 2 59.4 -26.1 44.5
Mzarity 80. 62. 54. 286 200.0 33.3 72. 462 3.3 200 3 0 5. 08 3.
Spll 667 55.61 57.2 20.0 200,0 33.3 200.01 56) 00 0. 3 0
'Iiticer 2000 750 5. 00 200.0 33.3 57.2L 250 50 0 2
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Mere Table 4
C"nalr Cat es: Fcacra Govrarncn Vrs a Privte Party
wiutr, e Mca Vaun3 Pm 'dav y confe- S A Vout3 Pc t MD 7b. Iem Share 0 SLrt
'
All P.ie Tera, 20) I(g) .w alOf True Mcrn D.i~aia ofgfs) 'Thsl Terin (X2) Significnt 0=0 in Vwilrq fle,-im?
Robcrtt 75.3 100.00
Steevm 404 10* 2 . 28.19 6.67
AFiro 72.7 103.00
Sealia 65,7 -1- 9.7 6.76 33.33 e
Kerrrr
"  
67.9 - 10.3 17,45 100.00 0ey
SoUT 5.8 t- 15. 24.01 66.67
Thn 72.3 -*9.1 13.64 60.67 00
Gisrg 50.0 -f. 14.4 20.19 66.67 )cs
'rnyr 53.9 +5 17.7 23,94 100.00 ),a
Regression Table 4
Criminal Cases. Federal Government Versus a Private Party
Correlation (p) / RI
Just ce Robers Stevens Alito Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas Ginsburg
Stevens 4
Alito
Scalitr
Kennedy U0.720.48
Scatter * 0.780.59
Ginsburg 0.83(0.67 * 0.77(0.55 0.96.0.91
Breyer _ 0.84;0.69 * 0.87(0.74 0.8& 0.72 0.860.72
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Data Table 5
Frst A ,r-rniwi RiL"t of E x .;,e AssecLiz .t. d Rcliailen
J Voez, for CLAm X2 2( Tam Anticipated Swe-
Vours
1997 1998 1999 2000 2801 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 For JAainst 2006 Err 2007
Tern Term Tcrn Tern Ten Term Tess Tess Tern Terrm Cbir Clam Tern Tam
o -rt.e of q0 444 24 20 .2 0,0 33 250 25.0 25..0 I 3
Srteri 0.0 1000 37-5 50.0 66.7 33.3 33.3 75.0 50.0 25.0 3 $1.3 -26.3 45.8
AlaO 4L) (0 i So, o is,6 0 I. 250 3.0 25.0 I 3
ScOlR 0.0 100.0 56.6 25.0 44.4 23.0 66.7 0.0 20.0 23.0 1 3 31.7 .6.7 24.8
Kenne* 0.0 100.0 77.8 75.0 66.7 0.0 50.0 50.0 16.7 25.0 1 3 43.6 -l.&6 35.0
Sc=r 100-0 100.0 28.6 50.0 66.7 25.0 33.3 75.0 20.0 25.0 3 49.6 -24.6 36.2
flm.s, 00 100.0 66.7 25.0 66.7 25.0 10.0 0.0 20.0 23.0 1 3 48.4 -23A 35.7
Ga=e.s 0.0 100.0 33.3 30.0 55. 25.0 33.3 30.0 60.0 25.0 I 3 30.9 -3.9 44.0
Brecr 1 0.0 300 12.5 75.0 55.61 25 16.7 25.0 66.7 0.0 0 3 24.2 -24.2 32.
4.sny 0.0 10 441 75:. -6 25.1 42.9 25.0 2.. 23.0 3 35.6 .13.61 340
0.21 0 0.0I 30.0.0 .0 7. 30 40.0 0. 2.0 30
Uemslnoeas 0.0 100 0 .0 0.0 0 0 0 .30 30. 0.2. 0_
Chart 5
First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and Religion
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5 62 +". 13.7 2321 25.00 e
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Regression Table 5
First Amendment Rights of Expressios. Association and Religion
Correlation (p)I R2
Justice Roberts Stevens Alito -- Scalia- -Kendy Souter Thomas Ginsburg
Stevens
Alito
Senncdy
Thomas 0 0.94(0.66
Ginsburg * 0.91,10.81 0.7610.553.004lBrecr I .004
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Data Table 6
Equal Pm =n .oi Claims
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 200 2003 2004 00 206 For Againg 2C36 iErro 2007
Term Term Term Term Term Term Tcrm Tcrm Term Term Cblim Claim Tcrm Term
Roberts 00 A0. 03 000
Alim 0 . lI" * "tt 75A 0.0 300.0 1 0
Scala 0.0 0.0 ,00 50.0 0. 60.0 30.0 25.0 0.0 oo. 1 0 20.6 79.4 39.7
Kenrndy 50.0 0.0 t00.0 50.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 75.0 0.0 l00.0 I 0 71.0 29.0 44.6
Thomas 0.0 0.0 100.0 s0.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 0.0 010 300.0 1 0 30.. 69.9 29.3
Ste ens 50.0 0.0 100.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 300.0 0.0 0 1 69.0 -69.0 73.0
Sume 300.0 0.0 300.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 300.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 0 70:9 -70.9 37.6
Ginshum 100.0 0 0.0 20.0 300.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 0 69.3 ,69.3 29.6
Breyer l00.0 0.0 3o0.0 50.0 0.0 40.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 0.0 01 94.4 .94.4 100.9
% ~ 0:0 ......
Spl
Maoiy 00 0 0 :00 230 00 40.0 300.0 75. 0.0 30.1 75.71 24.3, 40.31
25 0 0 :o
Split 3.0 0 0 201 0,0 0 0.0 750 0.0 30.0 1 0
Ulnanimous 0.0 41.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 300.0 0.01 0.0 1505.1 01 0
Chart 6
Equal Protection Claims
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qua" P etirn C is
Justice 'e r S3,nq i o Sab Aceual Vo3 Peom[r 3Thas Gn Shou a
____ All Prier Terms (p) Itnad (orTrueMer Drsismofp(s) This Term MX2 Sts1na Mna i Vo:W.3 Bebusler
S.brns 35.4 300.00
Stew. 53.6 .20.5 3$167 0.00 les
ARiM 48.0 *00.00
Scalia 322 3.35 :00.00 s
Keann4dy 9.6 19. 32.56 300.00
So=n 4.6 23.7 36.035 00.00,9
71==1 354 4. 24,4 36.67 30.0 . 1s
B r s s . 9 . 2 9 .4 4 1. 2 
. 0 0 ) o4
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Regression Table 6
Equal Protection Claims
Correlation (p)I RI
Justice Roberts Stevens Alato Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas Ginsburi;
Stnaens
Alito,
Scalia
Kennedy
C wna 0.97i0.93
Ginsbe 1.0013.00
jBrcycr I 0.89; 0.77 1 ____j____ 0.76.10-54 1____ 0.76.54
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Data Table?
St~wjmy C4 il RifCimso
J= vwts 1w, L~m X2 TmATf~dS
1997 199 1999 200 2001 200 2003 2004 2005 2006 Fm Against 2006 Effre 2007
Trim T=im TcfM Trm Trm Trm Trm Tcrm TcM, Tc=m C1m CtLM Te" _ Tcrm
SIMse=s 84.6 8.2 75.J 103.0 533 20.03 66.7 833 81.8 833 5 1 74.7 8.6 78.3
SMr 76.9 70.6 75.0 100.0 60.0 20.0 80.0 03.3 81.8 833 5 1 89.0 -5.7 6.6
G mbee 76.9 70,6 75,0 100.0 60.0 40.0 66.7 83.3 81.8 83.3 5 4 2.7 0.6 87
Barya 84.6 82.4 75.0 100.0 53,3 40.0 80.0 83.3 81.8 833 5 1 76.4 6.9 85.8
Alito 41,7 5133 26. & 6 33.3 37.5 66.7 4 2 •
K-mrd 61.5 47.1 2.) 33.3 20.0 40.0 66.7 33.3 54.5 66.7 4 2 33.5 33. 58.2
RobcM 3S 351 25 3.3 _ 4 50.0 20.0 50.0 60.01 3 2 * • •
Scaia 23.1 41.2 25.0 0.0 133 40.0 66.7 33.3 45.5 50.0 3 3 33.7 163 42.4
Threms 23.1 23.5 20 0.0 20.0 40.0 50,0 33.3 45.5 50.0 3 3 36.7 13-3 48,7
M4misy 61.5 64.7 25.03 3331 26.71 40.01 66,/ 43. 24~6. 66.7 56.5
Split 62.5 63.6 00 33.3 333 50.0 66.7 100 20 5. I
I~tzs 000 66.7 50.0 00 26 33 6. 00 s3 750 3 1
Chart 7
Slatutory Civil Rights Claims
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Twm=as 30,6 -9.3 13.92 50.80 yet
Gbstim 70.7 *. 11.4 15.96 83.33
8'.)- 77.0 1. 1.7 15.78 83.33
Regression Table 7
Statutory Civil Rights Claims
Correlation (p)I R2
Justice Roberts Stevens Alito Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas Ginsburg
Stevens
Alito 4
Scalia I
Kennedy 0.720.49
Souler * 0.7310.50
Thomas " 0.91/0.8t
Ginsbut * 0.88M0.76 * 0.9410.37
Breyer 1 0.9"10.92 * 0.9110.31 0.90.0.78
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Data Table 8
Coscs RiMro a C'alt-ng to tl= Esereise of Fc '-r~l Jrdtirtl.cin
Us= v% -,s for Curm X2 2UU6 larm I AoXt z.-
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 For Atalnst 206 Errer 2007
Term Tarm Tem Tam Term Term Term Term Term Term CUsM Cbim Term Trr
Stevens 51.7 65.0 100.0 69.4 03.3 47.6 773 62.5 73.3 72.0 18 7 65.9 6.1 74.6
Ginmrtw 55.2 60.0 '3.3 61.9 83.3 54.6 81.8 62. 60.0 72.0 1 7 00.6 -8.6 70.9
Sou er 60.7 60.0 83.3 684 3.3 S4,6 69.6 75.0 66.7 61.5 16 10 76.7 -15.2 68.4
Breyer 51.7 65.0 66.7 60.0 83.3 63.6 77.3 50.0 66.7 56.5 I 10 71 .14.5 67.3
K "nnedy 58 55.0 83.3 61.9 $83 50.0 54.6 62.5 75.0 56.0 14 11 44.3 11.7 61.3
Alito 43.3 55.0 85.3 47.4 676 Vr6 7 5) ( 4.5 48.0 12 13
Robcrs 4* " 7 6 5_ 5 2 57.1 45.8 11 13
Scolia 43.3 40.0 66.7 47.6 50.0 31.8 52.6 57.1 50.0 37. 5 9 I 48.4 -10.9 49.3
Thomas 46.7 45.0 83.3 47.6 58.3 38.1 45.5 57.1 43.8 33.3 8 16 52.8 -19.5 40.7
Majority 586 550 3.31 61.91 66.'7 54.61 65,21 62.5 62.5 56.0 141 I 3 70 6.
Sp ~ ~ 5-0 733 4. 67 62.5 5. 6.0 53.9 5.0 66.7 60.0 9 6
Untanlimoes 42.9 61. 5 1001.0 61.53 75.0 0.01 00.01 66.7 60.0 50.0 5 5
Chart 8
Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise or Federal Jurisdiction
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Cases Roisorga Chalkgoe to 06rrhp ujrrbir
kaie M- Vo PCcMUY W, .Co ~ Stoo.d Ac1J5 V83 1Pcr6c11 e d lb5$ t= SQ r Mr=W=n.3
All PiotTerrms (p) aIrraval Or Tno M oo t ev6fios a p (s) This Term X2) SixtifirorCh7 I, Von-ig Btaeio
- 5.,5 *45.$3
Saeem 6. +1- 5 14.73 72.00
Alito 54.6 * 4.00
SQUOI 47.5 +/- 6.2 10,73 37.50 Yfs
KeromlOS 57.9 1-/6.7 1142 36.00 00
SOL= 62.4 q. 9.7 15.05 61.54 00
Tbomas 494 .- 8.9 13.37 33.33 ye'
G3IMI8a 61.4 +1.112 15.64 72.00 30
0m)- 622 +1.9.6 12.90 5.32 6M
Regression Table 8
Cues Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction
Correlation (p) / RI
Justice Roberts Stevens Alito Scalia Kenncdy Souter Thomas Ginsburg
Stevens
Alito
Scalia * 0.71(0.48
Kennedy 0.79,0.60
Souter * 0.74;0.52 * 0.80,0.61 0.82,0.65
Thoms * 0.7510.52 * 0.860,73 0.77,0.57 0.760.54
Ginsburg * 0.89/0.78 * 0.7441.51 0.910.81
BrYeyr * I 0.78,0.57
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Data Table 9
FC.Crsliv. Cas-s
X2 2(P.16 ,17 S=3 T ri
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2001 2004 2005 2006 For Apinst 2M Etrr 2007
Trm Term Te-m Term Tern Term Term Term Term Term S= S. T ' Term TOM
S.b3 31.6 S2.0 46.7 57.1 53.6 57.1 60.0 25.0 33.3 60.0 6 4 20.3 39.7 38.2
IMllms 36.8 64.0 60.0 57,1 70.0 64.3 50.0 50.0 41.7 55.6 3 4 48.3 7.3 43.0
Robi Nts .hs )() I~B lb' OU 4bi 4N 7 4,6 ( 0 8.2 40.0 4 6
Siaecru 35.0 8,0 26.7 35.7 30.0 35.7 36.4 50.0 83 40.0 4 6 24.8 15.2 26.8
Ginsbur 36.8 28.0 33.3 28.6 40.0 42.9 36.4 37.5 8.3 40.0 4 6 22.9 17.1 20.6
Brc.cr 15.8 32.0 13.3 35.7 30.0 28.6 36.4 37.5 16.7 40.0 4 6 37.3 2.7 20.7
Alito 29 451 33 30 22. 30.0 3 7 .
K.encey 42.. 4*.0 33.3 42.9 70.0 50.0 54.6 25.0 41.7 30.0 3 7 44.7 -34.7 44
So.-r 35,8 32.0 20.0 35.7 30.0 28.6 45.5 37.5 8.3 20.0 2 8 33.2 -33.2 34.9
%4fjmiiy 33.6 36.01 46.7 42.9 50.0 42.9 36.4 37.5 16.7 300 3 7 36.7 .7 30.7
Split 44. 46.7 54.6 44.4; 57.3 50.0 28.6 50. 33) 37. 31
tu~z~u 200 300 21.0 400 33 1. 00 2, . .
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SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2006 TERM
III. Analysis3 2
Table 1: Civil-State Party
33
This Term Data Table 1 featured several of the most high-profile
cases of the Term-the school race cases, a school speech case, and a
partial-birth abortion case all fall within Data Table 1.34 Furthermore, for
the fifth year running, Data Table 1 provides the second most reliable
evidence of ideological bias on the Court35 -and the Court moved in a
32. Throughout Section IV, a footnote will list the cases tabulated on Tables 1-10. An
asterisk ("*") preceding a case citation indicates that it appears more than once on Tables 1
through 9. All cases on Table 10 appeared at least once on Tables 1 through 9. A "slashed Y"
("*") preceding a case citation indicates that more than one voting pattern was tabulated for the
case. See Appendix A ("A case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by different
voting alignments"). When more than one voting pattern is tabulated for a case, a number-
followed by an "x"-will follow the case citation. For example, "(2x)" means that two voting
patterns were tabulated for the case. Because more than one voting pattern may be tabulated,
some cases reflect both "liberal" and "conservative" outcomes on different issues. Not every case
decided by the Court is included on Tables 1-10. If a case does not involve the federal or state
government, or has governmental entities on both sides, it may not be included on Tables 1-4.
See Appendix A (definitions). Cases are included on Tables 5-9 only when they involve
questions involving the subject matter of those Tables (First Amendment, Equal Protection,
Statutory Civil Rights, Jurisdiction and Federalism questions). Id. Table 10 tabulates the
outcome of all cases decided by a single vote. Id. As a result of this classification scheme, not
every Supreme Court opinion is included in this Study. For 2006, the following cases did not fall
within the Study's established parameters: Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.
Ct. 2499 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec., L.L.C. v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007); Long Island Care
at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007); Beck v. Pace Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007);
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 127 S.
Ct. 1199 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1069 (2007); and Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799 (2007).
33. *Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007); *Morse v. Frederick, 127
S. Ct. 2618 (2007); *TSSAA v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007); *Powerex Corp. v.
Reliant Energy Servs., 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007); *Permanent Mission of India to the UN v. City of
New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007); *Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007);
Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam); Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007);
*L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007); *YVinkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.
1994 (2007) (2x); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007); *United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007); *Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); *Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194
(2007) (per curiam); Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007); *Purcell v. Gonzelez, 127 S. Ct. 5
(2006) (per curiam).
34. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738; Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618; Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
35. See 2006 Study, supra note 1, at 546 (indicating that year was the fourth in a row).
Fall 2008]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
conservative direction. The Court voted 5.9 points more conservatively
than in 2005 in the outcome of Majority Cases, 3.1 points more
conservatively in Split Cases, and 11.4 points more conservatively in
Unanimous Cases. The voting behavior of six of the seven Members of the
Court with enough history to make the calculations possible departed in a
statistically significant manner from past behavior on Table 1-and every
Justice voted more conservatively than his (or her) lifetime average.36 Only
Justices Alito and Kennedy voted more liberally than in 2005.37
But, despite this uniform conservative movement, the outcome on
Table 1 for 2006 may not be terribly noteworthy. Indeed, the unremarkable
nature of the outcomes on Table 1 is evidenced in the fairly close
correlation between anticipated and actual voting behaviors for the 2006
Term. 38 The voting behaviors of five Justices (Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens,
Kennedy and Thomas) were within 10 points of their anticipated scores,
while Justice Scalia was within 20 points of his anticipated score. Since we
did not project anticipated scores for the Court's two newest Justices, only
Justice Breyer's score was greater than 20 points from the anticipated
score. 39  Given the statistical limitations of this Study, these voting
behaviors were remarkably stable. Much of the conservative movement
may be attributable to the nature of the unanimous cases the Court decided.
Although unanimous outcomes are less likely to indicate bias, these cases
demonstrated the greatest conservative deviation from last Term's more
liberal results. Still the conservative drift is worth noting, as the Court
registered its third most conservative outcome in the past decade-at 68.4,
it is topped only by the 2001 (68.8) and 2004 (73.7) Terms.
Moderate individual conservative movement by most of the Justices
naturally resulted in moderate conservative outcomes with regard to other
statistical measures. The outcome of Majority Cases was 6.3 points more
conservative than antiqipated. 40 As for positioning, most Justices aligned
themselves along typical ideological lines-Justices Scalia (84.2) and
Thomas (82.4) were most conservative, followed by Chief Justice Roberts
(73.7). Justice Alito shares the middle spot with Justice Kennedy (63.2)
and the four liberal Justices each are somewhat less conservative-ranging
from Justice Souter's 57.9 to Justice Stevens' 47.4. Justices Stevens and
36. See supra Mean Table 1.
37. See supra Data Table 1.
38. See supra Data Table 1.
39. For more information about Justice Breyer's anticipated score and the vagaries of
ARIMA forecasting, see infra note 117.
40. See supra Data Table 1.
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Ginsburg voted together most often, followed by Justices Scalia and
Thomas.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government versus a Private Party41
Data Table 242 also evidences conservative movement on the Court,
somewhat undercutting our hypothesis that last Term's liberal movement
was significant.43 Contrary to that suggestion, Data Table 2 exhibits a
return to typical patterns of the past few years. Since 2001, the Court has
ranged between 75.0 and 81.8 points, except for 2005. Thus, 2006's 76.5
percent is well within the Court's rather consistent conservative behavior-
in fact, only 4.2 points off our prediction. Every Justice except Justice
Breyer voted more conservatively in 2006 than in 2005. Nevertheless,
Data Table 2 is not a strong indicator of ideological bias."
Last year, we noted that Chief Justice Roberts "demonstrated
surprisingly liberal voting behavior, siding with the government only half
the time. 45 That score may have been an aberration, as the Chief Justice
racks up the most conservative voting record on the Court this Term.
While the Court split along the usual lines-the four liberal Justices
voting more liberally than the other five-the division is not as pronounced
as on Data Table 1. The gap between the fifth- and sixth- most
conservative Justices is only 2.1 points, as opposed to 5.3 points on Data
41. *Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007); *Hein
v. Freedom From Religion Found, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); **Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588
(2007) (2x); *Federal Elec. Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2653 (2007); United States
v. Ati. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007); *Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S.
Ct. 2018 (2007); *Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011 (2007); EC Term of Years Trust v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 1763; Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007);
*Rockwell Int'l v. United States 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007); **Osbom v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881
(2007) (3x); *Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815
(2007); BP Am. Prod., Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006); Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625
(2006).
42. Observant readers may note that the Justices voted between fifteen and eighteen times in
this category, although the Court as a whole only voted seventeen times. Justice Souter (eighteen
votes) cast a vote on an issue that no other Justice reached in Osborn, while Justices Scalia and
Thomas (sixteen votes each) each declined to reach an issue that the rest of the Court did vote on
in that case. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer each recused themselves on two cases and,
therefore, only cast fifteen votes each.
43. See 2005 Study, supra note 1, at 548.
44. Factor analysis does not suggest that Table 2 provides highly reliable evidence of
ideological bias this Term. See infra Factor Analysis (Data Table 2-Civil cases involving the
federal government as party-ranked in fifth place this year for reliability with a score of -0.291,
significantly lower than fourth-place Data Table 9's score of 0.592).
45. See 2005 Study, supra note 1, at 549.
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Table 1. Moreover, Justice Scalia occupies the middle position, while
Justice Kennedy (in the third-most conservative position) voted less
liberally than Justice Thomas.
Despite our skepticism last year,46 the general rule that the federal
government wins in the Supreme Court continues to hold.47 The federal
government won 76.5 percent of the cases it brought before the Court. We
project that the federal government will win over two thirds of its cases
again next Tern.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases-State Government versus a Private
Party48
The Court registered somewhat of a fractured record for Table 3 in the
2006 Term, indicating the ideological tension among the Justices on some
issues in the State Criminal arena. Interestingly the Court showed
conservative movement when it voted unanimously, voting conservatively
80 percent of the time. In contrast, the Majority and Split cases show a
liberal movement. The greatest movement occurred in the Split cases, with
a 16.7 point liberal movement. This may be due to the "headline cases"
falling under Table 3, which were capital murder cases, indicating the
contentiousness of this debate. Roberts vigorously dissented in two cases,
declaring that precedents in this area of the law were "a dog's breakfast of
divided, conflicting, and ever-changing analyses. 'A9
Table 3 displays the stereotypical voting patterns of the individual
Justices with very pronounced bloc voting. Justice Kennedy, the least
conservative of the conservative bloc, voted at 64 percent while Justice
Breyer, the least liberal of the liberal bloc, voted more than 30 points more
liberally, down to 29 percent, indicating quite polarized voting behavior on
the Court. Justice Alito voted the most conservatively at 94.1 percent, with
46. See 2005 Study, supra note 1, at 549-50.
47. For a good example of this sort of case, see BP Am. Prod., Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638
(2006) (unanimously affirming the federal government's interpretation of statute regulating gas
and oil royalty payments).
48. Ayers v. Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006); Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006);
Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793, (2007); Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007);
Lawrence v. Florida., 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007); Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007);
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706
(2007); Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007);
Roper v. Weaver, 127 S. Ct. 2022 (2007) (per curiam); Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007);
Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321 (2007); Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007); Brendlin v.
California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007); Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
49. Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1715 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Scalia voting more conservatively than was predicted at 88.2 percent,
markedly more than our prediction of 58.5 percent. In contrast, Justice
Ginsburg voted more liberally than predicted at 23.5 percent, instead of our
prediction of 42.6 percent.
The only correlated voting behavior-and a weak correlation at that-
is between Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, signifying somewhat parallel
voting behavior by the Justices.5 °
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases-Federal Government versus a Private
Party
51
This was a strange Term for Criminal Federal cases, with only three
cases falling into this category and only four Justices who voted in all of
the cases. Regardless, Table 4 held its position as the third most reliable
indicator of bias for this Term. Furthermore, the 2006 Court decided Rita
v. United States,52 a case which shook up federal sentencing guideline
procedures. This could explain why the Court decided so few other
Criminal Federal cases this Term (with the Court possibly deciding to wait
to see how lower courts handled its opinion in Rita).
Notably on Table 4, Justice Scalia voted more liberally than any other
member of the Court, voting with the federal government in only 33.3
percent of the decided issues. This voting behavior may be explained by
Justice Scalia's inclination to accept "plain language" arguments-which
often lead him to vote in favor of federal criminal defendants.53
Data Table 5: First Amendment Cases-Rights of Expression,
Association, and Religion
54
The Supreme Court tends to accept few First Amendment cases,
making it difficult to track changes in voting behaviors of individual
Justices and the Court. However, this is not the only difficulty plaguing
Table 5. In addition to small sample size, the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence has been far from consistent and clear, rendering voting
behavior of the Justices and the Court as chaotic as the resulting doctrine.
50. See supra/infra Regression Table 3.
51. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce 127 S. Ct. 782 (2007); James v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 1586 (2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
52. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456.
53. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce 127 S. Ct. 782 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting); James v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 1586 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. *Federal Elec. Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2653 (2007); *Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); *TSSAA v. Brentwood Aead., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007);
*Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
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The disarray on Table 5 is striking. Four Justices (Stevens, Souter,
Thomas and Breyer) voted more than 20 points off their anticipated scores,
and one (Kennedy) 18.6 points off. All seven Justices with enough of a
lifetime voting record to make the calculation possible exhibited
statistically significant changes in their voting behavior on First
Amendment issues. Rather than evidencing changing voting behaviors,
these statistics seem to indicate doctrinal disarray.
This Term featured four First Amendment votes, down from last
Term's six. Only one of the four First Amendment claims in Federal
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.55 captured a majority
of the Court and each Justice only voted for a First Amendment claim once,
except for Justice Breyer, who voted against all First Amendment claims
this Term.56 Two of the cases were Unanimous,
57 and two Split.58
The two Split cases illustrate the Court's inability to agree on a
consistent ideology. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, the five Justice
plurality reversed the Court's course on campaign finance, upholding a
broad as-applied challenge to the same provision it had found facially
constitutional four years earlier. 59 However, Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas openly disagreed with the Chief Justice's plurality opinion as to
the rationale. 60 Likewise, in Morse (the famous "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
case), Chief Justice Roberts had five votes for a plurality outcome, but did
not command a coherent ideological rationale. 6' Justice Thomas, for
example, concurred in the plurality's result but indicated a willingness to
go much farther in reversing decades of the Court's precedents. Further
demonstrating the lack of cohesion within the plurality, Justices Alito and
Kennedy concurred separately to note the extreme narrowness of the
Court's holding, 62 essentially rendering the case a one-time exception to
prior cases without much further jurisprudential significance. Even the
four liberal Justices did not agree in dissent: Justice Stevens wrote a
vigorous First Amendment based dissent,63 but Justice Breyer declined to
55. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2658.
56. Note, however, that he declined to reach the First Amendment issue in Morse, 127 S. Ct.
at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. 2489; Davenport, 127 S. Ct. 2372.
58. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2658.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2674 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.
62. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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even reach the First Amendment issue, stating that he would have decided
the order-of-battle question differently.
64
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Cases
65
The Court generally decides few, if any, 66 Equal Protection cases each
Term, so it is not surprising that Table 6 is one of the least reliable
indicators of ideological bias on the Court,6 7 as well as one of the most
volatile categories of cases analyzed by the Study. This Term, like last, the
Court decided only one Equal Protection claim. But, unlike last Term, the
Court ruled in favor of the Equal Protection claim in a "pole switching"
opinion where conservative Justices cast liberal votes in favor of the Equal
Protection claim in order to achieve a politically conservative result.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, concerned a Seattle school district's use of race as a tie-breaking factor
in deciding school admittance to maintain racial balance in school
populations. 68  The conservative bloc on the Court accepted the Equal
Protection claim that use of race was unconstitutional, thereby reaching a
politically conservative result on the merits.69
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
70
Factor Analysis indicates that Table 7 is the least reliable indicator of
bias this Term. 71 The trend in the Majority cases is liberal, up from 54.5
percent to 66.7 percent of votes going in favor of the claim. The move in
Split cases is markedly liberal, moving 30 percentage points more liberal,
but still only reaching 50 percent, and the Unanimous cases changed
slightly conservatively from 83.3 percent down to 75 percent. Since Split
cases are more indicative of bias, the overall trend seems to be liberal.
Nevertheless, because of the small universe of cases, the movement on
Table 7 is hardly significant.
64. Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
66. See, e.g., 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 316. See also 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 28.
67. See supra Chart 6.
68. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2742.
69. Id. at 2742.
70. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006) (per curiam); Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910
(2007); Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018 (2007); Winkelman v. Parma
City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc. 127 S.
Ct. 2162 (2007); TSSAA v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
71. See supra Chart 7.
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Like Table 4, Table 7 shows the ideological rankings quite nicely with
Justices Alito and Kennedy holding the middle position, both with four
votes for the claim. 72 Interestingly, on this Table, Justice Alito votes more
liberally than Chief Justice Roberts.73 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
had a high voting correlation of .91, while Justice Breyer and Stevens held
the highest correlation at .96. Fairly strong correlations also occurred
between Justices Breyer and Souter and Justices Ginsburg and Souter.74
Our predicted voting behavior was fairly accurate on this Table, with less
than a twenty point deviation for all but one Justice. 75 Justices Scalia and
Thomas had a much greater deviation than anticipated.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
76
Table 8, despite slight conservative movement, demonstrates
continuation of the Court's long-term liberal tendency to reject challenges
to federal jurisdiction. Table 8, particularly when examined over time,
suggests that the Court favors federal jurisdiction more often than not and
that the Court's liberal stance is fairly stable. With the exception of 1999,
72. Cf supra Data Table 1 (Justices Alito and Kennedy again demonstrated identical voting
behavior).
73. See supra Data Table 7.
74. See supra Regression Table 7.
75. See supra Data Table 7.
76. *Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); *Hein
v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); *Wike v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588
(2007); *Federal Elec. Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2653 (2007); *Morse v. Frederick,
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); *Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007); *Bowles
v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007); *Permanent Mission of India to the UN v. City of New York,
127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007); Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2301 (2007); *Roper v.
Weaver, 127 S. Ct. 2022 (2007) (per curiam); *Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct.
2018 (2007); *Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011 (2007); *Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686
(2007); Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); Limtiaco v. Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413 (2007);
*Ytockwell Int'l v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007) (2x); *Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194
(2007) (per curiam); Sinochem Int'l v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping, 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007); *:Osbom v.
Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007) (2x); Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793, (2007) (per curiam);
Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
77. Observant readers may note that the Justices voted between twenty-three and twenty-six
times in this category, although the Court as a whole only voted twenty-five times. Justice Souter
(twenty-six votes) cast a vote on an issue that no other Justice reached in Osborn, while Justices
Scalia and Thomas (twenty-four votes each) each declined to reach an issue that the rest of the
Court did vote on in that case. Chief Justice Roberts (twenty-four votes) recused himself in
Hanson, while Justice Breyer (twenty-three votes) recused himself in Rockivell, in which the rest
of the Court voted on two jurisdictional issues.
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when an unusually high number of jurisdictional challenges were rejected,
the outcomes of Majority Cases on Table 8 have fluctuated within a
relatively narrow range of 54.6 percent to 66.7 percent in the last decade.78
79For the fourth year in a row, the voting behaviors anticipated by the
Study were fairly accurate, both for the individual Justices and the Court as
a whole (an outcome that may reinforce our observations regarding the
Court's established liberal stance on jurisdictional issues). The actual
voting behavior of all seven Justices for whom predictions could be made
fell within twenty points of their anticipated scores.
Despite the accuracy of prediction on Data Table 8, it remains the
second-least useful table at measuring ideological bias. We speculate that
this is due to the high amount of pole-switching voting on Table 8. It
appears that all of the Justices are willing to stretch various established
rules in order to favor their preferred outcomes on the merits. For instance,
all Justices were willing to reach the merits of the Equal Protection claim in
Parents Involved, despite the fact that the racial integration plan at the heart
of that litigation had not been employed in years and the students who had
been affected by it then had long since graduated from high school.80
Despite these facts, not a single Justice even cited to DeFunis v.
Odegaard,8' a classic mootness case in which the Court refused to reach
the merits because the petitioner would graduate from law school before
the Court's decision could affect his claim for prospective relief. Rather
than discussing the difficult mootness issues fairly raised by its precedents,
the Court glossed over them to reach the merits. Barring a change of
course, we continue to expect moderate-to-liberal outcomes on Data Table
8.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases
82
Table 9 is the fourth most reliable indicator of bias this Term.8 3 The
trend on Majority and Split cases is conservative, although the outcomes in
78. See supra Data Table 8.
79. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 950.
80. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2742.
81. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
82. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2738, 2742; Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006) (per
curiam); Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127
S. Ct. 1057 (2007); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); United Haulers Ass'n,
Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007); Winkelman v. Parma
City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007); L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007); Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
83. See infra Part V.
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two Unanimous cases reached liberal results. But, while there is arguably a
conservative trend on Table 9, the state is still winning less than half of the
time. Split cases are at 37.5 percent, up from 33.3 percent.
Table 9 shows Justices Scalia and Thomas voting the most in favor of
the state, a predictable outcome. Somewhat more surprising, however, is
the fact that three liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer) voted for
the state 40 percent of the time, more frequently than the Court as a
whole.84 Justices Alito and Kennedy both voted only 30 percent of the time
in favor of the state. In another notable voting pattern, Justice Souter is the
most liberal Justice on this Table.85
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Analysis: Who Votes Most Often With the
Majority in Close Cases? 86
Cases decided by a single vote (which most often involve five-four
decisions, but also include other circumstances where a change in a single
vote would alter the outcome, such as a five-three vote to reverse) fall into
the "swing vote" category and generally provide reliable evidence of
ideological trends on the Court.87 Many previous editions of this Study
demonstrate that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy tended to be the
"leaders" in casting the decisive vote in closely divided cases.88 With the
departure of Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy has moved squarely into
the limelight. In the 2006 Term, Justice Kennedy cast a staggering 100
percent of his votes with the majority in close cases-in other words,
Justice Kennedy decided every split decision in the 2006 Term.
84. See supra Data Table 9.
85. Id.
86. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007); Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738; Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders,
127 S. Ct. 2518; Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); Federal Elec.
Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2653 (2007); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618
(2007); Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007); Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007); Schriro v. Landrigan,
127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127
S. Ct. 1706 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007); James v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 1586 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89
v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007);
Limtiaco v. Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413 (2007); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S. Ct.
1105 (2007); Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057; Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007);
Ayers v. Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006).
87. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 36; 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 521.
88. See 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 318, 326, 331; 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 259; 1999
Study, supra note 1, at 605; 1998 Study, supra note 1, at 434, 489; 1997 Study, supra note 1, at
597.
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Justice Kennedy's influence moved the Court in a slightly
conservative direction compared to previous years. This year's Swing
votes were 60 percent conservative, up from 53.3 percent last Term.
89
While this is a recent high, one should not read too much into it. The
Swing Vote percentage has ranged within 10 points of 50 percent
conservative/liberal for the last decade, with only two exceptions. If
Justice Kennedy moves farther to the right, the Court as a whole will likely
follow, but Justice Kennedy is notoriously difficult to predict.
Conservative Justices clearly have more influence on the direction of
the Court in closely divided cases than the liberal Justices-Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito are the next most influential Justices after Justice
Kennedy (voting with the majority 70.8 percent of the time), followed by
Justices Scalia and Thomas (voting with the majority 62.5 percent of the
time). None of the liberal Justices managed to vote with the majority more
than 50 percent of the time-they ranged from 43.5 percent (Justice
Breyer) to 29.2 percent (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg).
IV. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the effectiveness of
this Study's categories in measuring liberal and conservative tendencies
and trends. As might be expected, some categories turn out to be more
reliable indicators of ideological tendencies than others.
The reliability of the various tables in this Study can be influenced by
many factors, including the particular makeup of the Court's caseload and
small sample size. Equal Protection cases in Data Table 6, for example,
tend to make up a small portion of the court's workload each term90 and are
consistently the least reliable indicator of ideological bias.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate between the
voting patterns of more liberal and more conservative Justices, we have
applied a statistical tool known as factor analysis. 9' In applying this tool,
we have determined that a primary factor may be extracted from the
Study's categories over the entire life of the Study that accounts for more
of the variance revealed by the data on Tables 1 through 9 than any other
factor.92 We interpret this "Factor 1" as liberal/conservative bias simply
89. Note that swing vote cases that are not otherwise within our universe of cases are not
tallied toward liberal/conservative outcomes, though they are counted toward a Justice's
percentage voting with the majority in Swing Vote cases. See infra Appendix A.
90. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 37. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
91. See 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 564.
92. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
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because that is what this Study purports to measure. The categories
currently load onto Factor 1 as follows:
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Category Factor 1
Criminal/State Party -0.856
Civil/State Party -0.777
Criminal/Federal Party -0.638
Federalism -0.592
Civil/Federal Party -0.292
First Amendment -0.274
Equal Protection -0.204
Jurisdiction -0.154
Statutory Civil Rights -0.112
Variance 2.3311
% Variance 0.259
According to this ranking, Table 3 (Criminal/State Party) cases are
again the most reliable indicator of liberal/conservative leanings over time.
Tables 3, 1, 4, and 9 are ranked in the same order of reliability as last Term,
and remain the most reliable indicators of ideological bias, while the
remaining five continue to be of questionable value in that regard.
As we noted in the 2003 Study,93 these results may seem counter-
intuitive to those holding a stereotypical understanding of the Court-that
issues relating to the First Amendment, Statutory Civil Rights, and Equal
Protection would (seemingly) provide nearly perfect opportunities for the
Justices to show their ideological leanings. However, as we have discussed
in three prior studies, 94 such cases often involve "pole-switching," where
Justices vote "conservatively" (under the definitions of this Study) in order
to further a "liberal" policy preference, or vice versa.95
93. See supra Data Table 5 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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V. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over time
is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already discussed is
that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their validity. Another is
dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases appealed to the Court
from one Term to the next and the Court's selection of which cases it will
decide. With varying parameters such as these, is there any meaningful
way to quantify, analyze and compare the Justices' inclinations? One
potentially useful method is frontier analysis.
96
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather than
their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined by the highest
and lowest scores in each category and each combination of categories.
Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the established frontier. By
adjusting the relative weights allocated to each category, the frontier can be
adjusted to reflect each category's reliability-as determined by the factor
analysis described in Section V.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court in
Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Analysis Charts 1-4. Two
versions of each frontier are presented.
In Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights applied
to each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy in Part V. On
these Tables, weights are chosen for each Justice that produce the highest
frontier score for him or her, subject to the limitation that Equal Protection
(the least reliable category) cannot receive more weight than Civil Federal
Party (the next least reliable category), Civil Federal Party cannot receive
more weight than Statutory Civil Rights, and so forth, moving upward from
the least reliable category set out in Part V.
Frontier Analysis Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting constraints at all;
instead, these tables choose, for each Justice, those weights that present
him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible.
Each Table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those with
a score of 100 percent reach the frontier by employing the category weight
distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than 100 percent
indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice could obtain
with optimal weighting places him or her at the indicated percentage of the
way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal combination of weights
96. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
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may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This condition is known as
"superefficiency" and is noted in the charts when present.
Frontier Analysis Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores for each
Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the bottom of
each chart is an indication of new Justices as they replace outgoing Justices
on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are not indicated, they
contributed to the determination of the liberal and conservative frontiers
during Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Analysis Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of
constrained frontier scores during the course of this Study. They are easier
to read than the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justice's
relative positions and score ranges overall. They do not, however, show
any trend information.
According to the Frontier Analysis Table 1, "Conservative Frontier-
Constrained," Justice Alito was the most conservative Justice in 2006. 97
Five Justices were able to reach the conservative frontier on the constrained
Frontier Analysis Table,98 with superefficient scores ranging from 107
percent (Justice Alito) to 101 percent (Justice Scalia). Somewhat
surprisingly, Justice Breyer was able to reach the conservative frontier (at
104 percent superefficiency), while Justice Kennedy fell short (at 91
percent). Justices Stevens (88 percent) and Souter (88 percent) were the
least conservative Justices on the constrained Frontier Analysis Table.
99
Frontier Analysis Table 2, which shows the results from a constrained
calculation of the liberal frontier, shows two Justices with superefficient
scores: Justices Stevens (109 percent) and Souter (104 percent). 00 Justices
Ginsburg, Kennedy and Scalia were each able to reach the constrained
liberal frontier, scoring exactly 100 percent. Chief Justice Roberts was the
least liberal Justice (86 percent). 10'
The unconstrained Frontier Analysis Tables maximize the effects of
pole-switching and other potentially "distorting" voting behaviors and,
therefore, do not provide very reliable evidence of conservative or liberal
bias. The real importance of the unconstrained Tables is that they illustrate
97. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
101. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 2. Compare this to 2003 Study, supra note 1, at
Frontier Analysis Table 2.
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the value of the constrained analysis and the importance of factor
analysis. 102
Unlike last year, every Justice was able to reach the unconstrained
frontier on both Tables 3 and 4. The overall suggestion of the frontier
analysis charts may well be that the Court, as a whole, is not as divided as
it has been in past years. The scatterplot charts show that the Justices are
clustered much closer together near the liberal and conservative frontiers
than the Justices of some past Courts. Whether this result is an aberration,
a fulfillment of Chief Justice Roberts's stated goal of acting with consensus
on the Court, or some other factor will likely become evident in future
years.
Conclusion
The voting patterns tabulated by the 2006 Study reveal (as should be
expected) a Court in transition. The generally consistent conservative
voting patterns of Chief Justice Rehnquist have been replaced with several
surprisingly liberal voting patterns tallied by Chief Justice John Roberts
(who was the most liberal Member of the Court on Table 2, and who voted
more liberally on Tables 4 and 9 than the historical practice of the past
Chief Justice). Associate Justice Alito voted rather more conservatively on
Table 3 than the historic patterns of Associate Justice O'Connor (whom he
replaced on the Court). As a result, Table 3-this Term's most reliable
indicator of ideological bias-demonstrates a significantly wider "gap"
between the conservative and liberal wings of the Court than in the recent
past. The overall-all conservative impact of Justice Alito, however, is
tempered by the fact that (as with the new Chief Justice) he demonstrated
fairly consistent liberal voting behavior on Tables 4 and 9.
The ideological posture of the Court-considered as a whole-may be
difficult to reckon. Six Tables demonstrate conservative movement
(Tables 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 and 10) while two Tables demonstrate liberal
movement (Tables 3 and 7) and two Tables (5 and 6) present so little data
that they are of little value in evaluating ideological trends (a conclusion
which might also be applied to Table 7). The Court, therefore, appears to
be moving in a moderately conservative direction.
The question for the future is whether the conservative bloc (led by
Justice Kennedy in the decision of swing-vote cases) will hold as new
102. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 818 ("The unconstrained Frontier Tables amplify the
effects of pole-switching. Accordingly, the most reliable evidence of ideology on these Tables
comes from the constrained analysis.").
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appointees are named to the Court. While our Frontier Analysis may
suggest that the Court, viewed as a whole, may be "voting together"
somewhat more than in the recent past, the voting patterns tabulated on
Tables 1-10 continue to show a Court that (in contested cases) continues to
be polarized into five-Member conservative and four-Member liberal blocs.
A change in the ideological orientation of only a single Justice, in such
circumstances, can dramatically impact the outcome across the entire range
of issues examined by this Study.
APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided by full
opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if accompanied
by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are included only if
they are accompanied by a full opinion of the Court and not if the only
opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-four vote resulting in
affirmance without written opinion have been excluded. Both signed and
unsigned per curium opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth
reasons in a more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of
these categories are not included in the database for any of the tables. For
the 2006 Term, the Supreme Court released seventy-five slip opinions. Of
these, two were summary dismissals, 10 3 while eleven did not raise issues in
any of our nine categories. 104 Thus, the universe of cases for the 2006
Term includes sixty-two cases.
103. Toledo-Flores v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006) (per curiam) (dismissing the writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted); Claibome v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007) (per
curiam) (vacating as moot the Eighth Circuit's judgment upon notice of the death of the
petitioner).
104. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec.,
L.L.C. v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct.
2339 (2007); Beck v. Pace Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr,
127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007); Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007);
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 127 S. Ct. 1199 (2007); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799 (2007).
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2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. 10 5  Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a problem of
classification. No cases in 2006 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables I through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true of
criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if they do not
satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be the United States
government or one of its agencies or officials 0 6 or, with respect to a state
government, one of its political subdivisions. A suit against a government
official in a personal capacity is included if that official is represented by
government attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise
clearly implicated. 07 In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is
excluded if United States governmental entities appear on both sides of the
controversy. 10 8 If both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same
suit on the same side with only private parties on the other, the case is
included on Data Tables 1 and 2.109 A case is included more than once on
105. Note that petitions for federal habeas relief, though technically civil cases (generally
against a state warden or other prison official), are classified as criminal. See, e.g., Ayers v.
Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007). Also note that actions protesting prison conditions or
treatment are classified as civil, despite involving parties incarcerated under criminal law. See,
e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam) (regarding the proper administration
of prisoner's hepatitis treatment).
106. E.g., Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018 (2007). The Office of
Senator Dayton is treated as a federal party.
107. E.g., Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (involving Fourth Amendment issues
relating to a high-speed car chase where state would likely indemnify police officer).
108. E.g., Limtiaco v. Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413 (2007) (Attorney General and Governor of
Guam on opposing sides); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist.
No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007). However, a case is included in Data Table 1 or
Data Table 2 if a foreign sovereign opposes a U.S. government party. E.g., Permanent Mission of
India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007). The Study's definition
of conservative as voting for a U.S. government party does not break down if that vote is against
a foreign government, whereas the case is unclassifiable if the vote is for one U.S. government
entity but against another.
109. E.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
The Arizona attorney general and the United States solicitor general both were interested parties
as attorneys of record on the same side.
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the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome
of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments.' 0
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opinion. One
case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is also included
more than once on the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues in
the category affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are resolved
by different voting alignments. A case is not included on a table if an issue
raised by one of the litigants is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues poses
no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly identified in
the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, association and free
exercise of religion are included. However, Establishment Clause cases are
excluded since one party's claim of religious establishment is often made
against another party's claim of free exercise or some other individual
right, thus blurring the issue of individual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to those
invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and other civil rights statutes expressly
barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex,
religion, age or physical handicap."' Actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal
statute, or if the issue involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the
case at hand. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the
substantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution and the
issue relates to that constitutional right.'1 2 The purpose of this exclusion is
to preserve the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness, abstention,
110. E.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007); Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321 (2007);
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007); Rockwell Int'l v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 1397 (2007); Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007).
111. This includes IDEA, despite much of that statute moving beyond antidiscrimination to
creating positive entitlements. Thus, Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. 1994, is included in the statutory
civil rights category.
112. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam). Petitioner sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when his hepatitis
treatment was discontinued.
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equitable discretion1 1 3 and justiciability.'14  Jurisdictional questions are
excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of the
Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may comment on its
jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in which
there were issues raised by the conflicting actions of federal and state or
local governments. Common examples of these issues are preemption,
intergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments as a limit on federal government action and federal court
interference with state court activities (other than review of state court
decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism (where the regulatory power
of one state assertedly conflicts with the regulatory interests of sister states)
or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant Commerce
Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, in most instances are
excluded from the table.15
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a single
vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three decisions, if
any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that reverse a lower court
decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or four-two are not included
because a shift of one vote from the majority to the minority position would
still result in affirmance by a tie vote. Reversals by a vote of five-two are
also not included, as four-three reversals, though disfavored, are valid.' 1 6 A
case is included more than once in the table if it raises two or more distinct
issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are resolved by
different voting alignments. Swing votes are considered liberal or
conservative outcomes when the same voting alignment is used to decide
113. Also included in this concept is the Court's decision itself not to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction. E.g., Roper v. Weaver, 127 S. Ct. 2022 (2007) (per curiam).
114. E.g., Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011 (2007) (declining jurisdiction in one
Article I court in favor ofjurisdiction in another).
115. This Term, one opinion involving the Dormant Commerce Clause-United Haulers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007)-was included
on Table 9 (Federalism) because the Court's rejection of the Dormant Commerce Clause claim
unequivocally favored state rather than federal regulatory power.
116. For an example of such a case, see Hartman v. Moore, 126 S. Ct. 1695 (2006).
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an issue on Tables 1-9; cases that do not appear on Tables 1-9 are not
counted as liberal or conservative outcomes.'
17
APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme Court
voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages and relationships
among the Justices' voting patterns. The following sections explain the
statistical methods employed in this Study and how test results should be
interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a Justice
voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category. Some
categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in coarser score
increments. For example, a category including ten cases during the term
will have the potential for eleven different scores (0 percent through 100
percent, in 10 percent increments), while a category with only one case
during the Term will provide only two score possibilities (0 percent and
100 percent).
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.' 18 This model is useful in
circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's score)
is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with no other
explanatory variables. ARIMA is an acronym for Auto Regressive
Integrated Moving Average. The model is most easily explained by
starting in the middle of the acronym:
117. E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), Zuni Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007); Limtiaco v. Camacho, 127 S. Ct.
1413 (2007); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1105 (2007).
118. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical software
with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q) model, see Peter
Kennedy, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (1992).
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Integrated:
Auto-Regression:
Moving Average:
This term refers to a differencing process which
operates in a manner similar to differentiation of a
continuous function in calculus. The goal is
simply to remove trend from the time series data
by subtracting each score in the time series from
the next score in the series. The resulting
differences form a new time series. This operation
may be repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs
only one differencing operation.
Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be determined. 1 9
This parameter seeks to relate each data point in
the stationary series to the data point immediately
preceding it through multiplication. That is:
X, = AXt 1
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A
is the autoregressive parameter, and X,_1 is the
value of the data series point immediately
preceding X.
Because we are dealing with a series of data
points, however, a single parameter will almost
never precisely produce the relationship just
described for all data point pairs. Some error is
inevitable. We therefore seek to determine that
parameter which produces the least total error
when applied to the entire series.
120
A second parameter is determined that relates the
value of each series element X to the error
between the estimated value and the actual value
of the previous element X,-,. That is:
119. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to various
properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
120. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is chosen
such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
Fall 20081
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Synthesis:
X, = -Bxt-i
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The
value of this parameter is also optimized to
minimize its total error when applied to the series.
The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Axt,-Bx,1+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining
between the calculated and actual values of X,.
This final equation is used to predict the series
score for the upcoming Term.1
21
121. This term, our prediction for Justice Breyer on Table 2 was off by 43 points. After
inspecting a graph of the actual data series (see Figure xx), one might wonder how our predictive
model could have gone so wrong.
Justice Breyer-Chart 2
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Figure xx
However, if we remove the actual 2006 score (which was unknown and therefore not available as
input to the model), and if we add the complete set of scores predicted by the model (see Figure
xy), things look a little better.
[Vol. 36:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2006 TERM
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Figure xy
The dotted line in the graph shows the ARIMA estimates for each point based on best fit (least
error) values for pt, 0, and 0 (see Appendix A, Part B. Predictive Modeling). The model does a
pretty good job of tracing the actual data-up to the last (2006) estimate. The last estimate,
however, does not seem so unreasonable if one considers that Justice Breyer's actual 2006 score
is visually rather an "outlier" in the context of the five scores immediately preceding it which
trend upward toward our 2006 estimate. Also, ARIMA's more visually satisfying prediction for
2007 helps to bolster confidence in the model (see Figure xz).
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C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test" 122 to determine whether this Term's score
(X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean of all
previous Terms' scores (XI). Essentially, we treat these two numbers as the
means of two independent samples drawn from the universe of all scores in
the category. 123 We hypothesize that X, is also the true mean of the
population it, and we set up this hypothesis (the "null" hypothesis) and its
corresponding alternative hypothesis as follows:
H,: gt = X, The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X 2 does not
significantly shift gt from its previous value on the
real number line. Therefore, the two samples are
statistically equivalent.
Justice Breyer-Chart 2
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Figure xz
Attempting to predict the Justices' scores is an ambitious undertaking, but the authors enjoy
trying.
122. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P.
MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also Craig &
Hogg, supra note 6.
123. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling, small
samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to impose some
measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
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Ha: gtE X1  The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X 2 significantly
shifts i from its previous value on the real number
line. Therefore, the two samples are not
statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a certain
confidence interval, 124 by rejecting the null hypothesis.1 25  This is
accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
X2-pt-~ S / F
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired .0 and
the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).126  If the absolute
value of t is greater than the table entry, H0, is rejected and we say that the
Justice has shown a statistically significant change in voting behavior this
Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be mapped
over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921) between the voting
percentages of the former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia for the
Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an upward sloping
line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting percentages of the
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens show only a very weak, negative
correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely scattered about a
downward sloping line. Statistically significant correlations between and
among Justices' Term-to-Term voting percentages are shown in Regression
Tables 1-10. The first number in each pair is the Pearson correlation
124. We have selected a confidence interval of 95 percent. Because this is a two-tailed test,
72 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction), = .025.
125. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is beyond the
scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error. For a complete
explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 122.
126. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized parameter,
so k = 1.
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coefficient. The second number is an r2 statistic, which is a more reliable
measure of the actual level of correlation.l
2 7
Equal Protection Cases
y = 0.717x + 7.4944
R2 = 0.7921
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rehnquist
Figure 1
Equal Protection Cases
y = -0.1542x + 35.473
R2 = 0.0473
20 40 60 80 100
Stevens
Figure 2
127. The r2 statistic is an estimate of 2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the tables is a
result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
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The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two Justices
does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It simply means
that their scores tend to move up and down together from one Term to
another. Also note that correlation in no way implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt to
identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using batteries of
tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that validly measure the
characteristics of interest. This Study similarly attempts to measure the
Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by "testing" their disposition of
certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using Minitab
software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by extracting a
single factor, using principal components analysis and applying a QMAX
rotation to the data. A full description of the theory and mathematics
underlying factor analysis is beyond the scope of this appendix, but several
books on the subject are available that provide reasonably simple
explanations of this complex process.1
28
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an example.
Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of "world's greatest
athlete." Their scores in two events are listed in the following table:
Croquet Marbles
Alan 9 2
Betty 7 7
Chuck 4 5
Debbie 3 8
Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet player
because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while Debbie would
argue that the best marbles player should win because each has scored
highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty would argue that each
sport should receive equal weight, because her combined score with equal
128. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1990).
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weightings would be higher than either Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty
would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7, while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2
x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score 4.5, and Debbie would score 5.5. The
following figure plots the athlete's scores graphically:
Marbles Athletic Frontier
10
A
* B
C
5 --
0 ....
0.
0 5 10
Croquet
A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting points
A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary beyond
which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative weights assigned
to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100 percent of the
frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be superefficient to the extent her
point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two points adjacent to it on
the frontier. A and D are also superefficient to the extent they lie beyond
lines (not shown) connecting B with the points at which the frontier meets
each axis. C falls short of the frontier regardless of the weights assigned to
marbles and croquet. However, an optimal set of weights may be selected
such that C "looks his best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine which
Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However, instead of two
dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis includes nine
dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes). Although human
minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions, computers can handle
the required calculations with ease. We performed our analysis using
Microsoft Excel's solver feature. Although the formulas and procedures
involved are straightforward, a complete description of them is beyond the
scope of this appendix.
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